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1. Introduction 
 
This paper will examine the decision making process by which individual voters cast 
their ballots. In particular, it will discuss two traditional explanations of electoral behaviour: 
ideological voting and performance voting. These explanations of voting share a common 
assumption: electors’ decisions are based on what they expect to get from their choice. Each 
potential outcome has a benefit or a cost, and citizens might choose the one benefiting them 
most or costing them least. That is, voters will maximize the utility of their electoral decision. 
In order to maximize the utility of a given decision an individual needs to have a certain 
amount of information at hand. 
 
Previous research has explained the simple and straightforward decision rule at work in 
both ideological and performance voting. In the case of ideological voting, citizens vote for 
the party that is perceived closer to their ideal position on the left-right dimension. Given the 
lack of perfect information for the electorate, Downs conceived ideology as an information 
saving device. That is, a perceptual cue that helps ordinary citizens to have a general idea 
about the policy positions of the main parties of their political system. In the case of 
performance voting, citizens decide on a standard of what they consider good performance, 
and reward the incumbent if this standard has been achieved, punishing the incumbent 
otherwise. Again, governments’ performance is often considered as a particular low-cost 
indicator that any given citizen can use as a heuristic tool to decide her vote in place of more 
costly and less salient information (such as electoral manifestos, or policies). 
 
Yet in order to be able to judge incumbent governments by their performance or by 
their ideologies, voters must have a certain degree of information and factual knowledge such 
as the state of the economy, international politics, or the ideological positions of each of the 
policies included in parties’ manifestos. However, research on public opinion and voting 
behaviour from Converse (1964, 1970) onwards often indicates that the overall level of 
information, knowledge and comprehension of politics amongst the average citizen is relatively 
poor. We need therefore to systematically consider the degree of information and factual 
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political knowledge citizens have at their disposal. Does political knowledge mediate the 
logic of ideological or performance voting?1 
 
While models of ideological or performance voting generally assume that all citizens 
are similarly informed and equally guided by the same considerations or motives (Downs, 
1957; Kramer, 1971 and 1983; Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979 and 1981), in this paper I analyze 
the extent to which the electors’ degree of factual political knowledge influences their 
decision-rules when casting their ballot. Previous literature has provided contradictory 
answers to this question. For instance, Krause (1997) finds that uninformed citizens are less 
likely to vote on the basis of government’s performance, but Zaller (1992, and 2004) argues 
the opposite. According to Zaller, poorly informed citizens are more likely to vote on the 
basis of performance or other currently salient issues, whereas informed electors use an 
ideological logic when deciding their vote. This is very much the opposite of Fearon’s views 
about retrospective voting on the grounds of performance. As he puts it, 
 
“There can be no doubt that formidable problems are involved in monitoring and evaluating 
incumbent behavior to make informed judgements about whether to reelect (…) Voters have 
neither the time to follow policy debates… nor the training and skill to evaluate conflict “expert” 
arguments about what is best” Fearon, 1999: 68). 
 
Performance voting thus requires a considerable amount of political knowledge. 
Rational voters would only use the logic of performance if they are well-informed: therefore, 
the conclusion would be that political knowledge is positively related to performance voting, 
and negatively related to ideological voting. 
 
We have therefore contradictory arguments about the relationship between political 
knowledge, on the one hand, and performance and ideological voting on the other. To answer 
these questions, I provide empirical evidence from post-electoral survey data for 
parliamentary elections held in four different polities: Spain, Hungary, Poland, and Portugal. 
The data come from the CSES Module 2 third advance release dataset – June, 2005, where 
                                               
1 In this paper I use the concept of political knowledge referring to factual political knowledge of citizens 
(Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996). This implies knowledge about rules, actors, the relevant political issues of the 
polities, and the capacity of individual citizens to influence the political outcome. Other scholars use other terms 
to refer to the same topic as, for instance, political awareness (Zaller, 1992) or political sophistication (Luskin, 
1990). 
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comparable information about citizens’ degree of political knowledge is available across 
countries. By selecting countries with diverse political structures, I will be able to test 
whether the effect of political knowledge on the logic of voting is common across individuals 
in diverse polities. 
 
I proceed in four parts. First, in section 2 I review the literature on the logic of 
ideological and performance voting and discuss the critical assumption that both theories 
share: that this logic of voting can be used to the same extent by all citizens, independently of 
their degree of political expertise. I present specific hypotheses regarding the likelihood of 
citizens to rely on this logic depending on their level of political knowledge. I follow this 
with a section discussing issues of data and case selection in section 3. After testing my 
hypotheses in section 4, I conclude that while the influence of political knowledge is clear on 
performance voting across polities, the effect is less conclusive on ideological voting. I 
finally discuss the broader implications of these empirical results for the theories on 
ideological and performance voting. 
 
 
 
2. The argument: Why political knowledge? 
 
The ideological logic of voting was initially proposed by Downs (1957). His departure 
point was that voting decisions can be explained as rational behaviour. When faced with a 
decision that affects her interests, the individual will choose the most cost-effective means of 
maximizing her gains. An action that maximizes utility is rational. For a citizen to take such 
rational action, however, she needs to rank her preferences in transitive order and choose her 
most preferred alternative. This citizen, then, will always make the same decision if presented 
with the same set of alternatives in different points in time (Downs, 1957: 6). These criteria 
assume that citizens have information at hand that allows them to make their choices. 
 
But individuals do not always have a clear notion of what they want as an outcome of 
their actions, of how the alternatives relate to such outcome, or of how the different outcomes 
relate to their own interests. Therefore Downs assumed that citizens do not take their political 
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decisions under conditions of perfect information. Rather, they live in a world of uncertainty 
where they search for information before coming to a decision. Information gathering, and 
processing it, is however, a costly action. Hence, some voters might be able and motivated to 
invest time and resources to collect information whereas others might not. Under these 
conditions, parties’ ideologies appear to be information short-cuts for voters who cannot 
judge politics expertly. The ideological labels of parties then guide non-expert citizens about 
the general political intentions of parties. More specifically, ideologies can order on a single 
policy dimension the programmes of political parties. The main assumption of Downs is that 
the majority of policy issues are related and can be included in this single political dimension. 
In sum, ideology appears as an information saving device or heuristic (Popkin, 1991; 
Sniderman et. al., 1991) that citizens use to guide their political decisions. 
 
Nevertheless some electors might encounter difficulties both in defining their own 
preferences in the ideological dimension and in placing the political parties’ policies. In fact, 
survey research on citizens’ attitudes has shown that the public in general presents low levels 
of factual political knowledge. Moreover the competences needed to form and express 
consistent opinions appear to be limited (Althaus, 2003, Converse, 1970; Bennet, 1988 and 
1989; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996). If citizens are politically ignorant, they may not be 
able to organize consistently their opinions by their ideology. In this case the ideological 
labels of parties would not work as a shortcut for ignorant citizens to decide their vote. 
Previous research has shown that there are significant differences in the structure and stability 
of political attitudes and ideology among knowledgeable and ignorant citizens (Bartle, 1997; 
Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Sinnott, 2000): the former have more consistent political 
ideologies, opinions and attitudes. Therefore, in order to use ideology as a criterium for 
voting, electors need some amount of information. Voters with little information about the 
positions of candidates on important issues will use ideology to cast their votes to a lesser 
extent than knowledgeable citizens. 
 
There is, however, another possible argument about the role of factual political 
knowledge on ideological voting. For ideology to work as an information saving device, 
citizens should know something about politics but not to the extent that they become experts. 
If this were the case, the effect of political knowledge on ideological voting would be non 
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linear. Moderately knowledgeable citizens might rely on the ideological logic of voting to a 
greater extent than either ill informed citizens or perfectly well informed citizens. Studying 
the influence of political knowledge on information diffusion and opinion change, Zaller 
(1992) finds a non-monotonic relationships between political knowledge and opinion change 
in response to messages from the mass media. Well-informed citizens are more likely than 
poorly informed ones to receive and to understand such messages but, at the same time, they 
are less likely to change their own opinions. Moderately well-informed citizens show the 
greatest levels of media-induced opinion change in comparison with both ill-informed and 
well-informed citizens.  
 
Therefore, empirical evidence shows that some people tend to be more informed than 
others. This variance is unevenly distributed, since the highest degree of political knowledge 
is concentrated among the politically and socially advantaged. Much of the empirical 
variation in the propensity to know about politics is explained by individual differences in 
motivation, ability, and opportunity (Althaus, 2003; Bennet, 1995; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 
1996).2 The main question that I shall examine is the extent to which variations in factual 
political knowledge influence voters’ propensity to use ideology when casting their ballots. 
More informed voters will have a consistent, ideologically sophisticated interpretation of the 
world. I expect to find that the likelihood of using ideology as a criterium to decide which 
party to vote will be higher among voters with medium or high levels of political expertise 
than among those with a low level of political knowledge. 
 
The logic of performance voting is apparently very simple. When deciding how to vote 
electors seek to maximize their utility from the outcomes of the policies implemented by the 
incumbent. Hence, in the logic of performance voting citizens are guided by outcomes rather 
than policies. They calculate a threshold of general welfare and, if they consider that the 
incumbent has achieved this, they re-elect the government. For the logic of performance 
                                               
2 The discussion about the sources of differences in the levels of citizens’ factual political knowledge is 
beyond the scope of this paper, but according to Althaus (2003), motivation to became informed seems to 
depends on interest in politics, and sense of civic duty; the ability to process political information is enhanced by 
education and by routine exposure to daily news whereas opportunities to become informed depends on the 
content of available news coverage, geographical location of the citizen, and some other contextual 
characteristics of the place where the individual lives. (see also Bennet, 1995; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996) 
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voting to work, however, electors need political information. They need to know which party 
is (or are, in the case of coalition governments) in government; what changes have taken 
place during the mandate in economic conditions, international politics, or whatever 
outcomes they consider relevant; and the extent to which the incumbent government is 
responsible for such outcomes. 
 
When voters are poorly informed about politics, these three conditions might not be 
present. If this is the case, citizens will not decide their vote on the basis of an informed 
evaluation of government’s performance. Factual political knowledge helps people to better 
assess their interests as individuals and as members of groups. It is a key determinant of 
instrumental rationality (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996). The more knowledgeable citizens 
are, the better will they understand the impact of public policies on their own interests, and 
the more likely will they vote on the basis of performance. Studies about voting as a response 
to the economic performance of government have often treated the electorate as 
undifferentiated, ignoring systematic heterogeneity among voters (exceptions are Althaus, 
2003; Gómez and Wilson, 2001 and 2006; Krause, 1997). My claim here is that we need to 
test the extent to which performance voting is influenced by the degree of factual political 
knowledge of citizens. The theoretical expectations to be tested in this paper are summarised 
in Table 1. 
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Table 1. A summary of theoretical expectations 
 The influence of factual political knowledge 
                               IDEOLOGICAL VOTING 
    Authors                                                                      Hypotheses 
 
Downs, 1957 and later interpretations: 
for example, Popkin, 1991. 
No effect of citizens’ factual political knowledge on the 
propensity to vote according to ideology Þ ideology 
operates as an information saving device or heuristic that 
citizens use to guide their political decisions. Therefore, 
the propensity to vote ideologically will be homogeneous 
across citizens independently of their political expertise  
 
A refutation of the assumptions of 
Downs and others. 
The propensity to vote ideologically will be heterogeneous 
across citizens, depending on their political expertise Þ 
The likelihood of using ideology will be higher among 
voters with medium or high levels of political knowledge 
                THE LOGIC OF PERFORMANCE VOTING 
    Authors                                                                      Hypotheses 
 
Key, 1966 and later interpretations:  
Kramer, 1971 and 1983; Kiewiet, 
1983; Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979 and 
1981, etc. 
 
No influence of citizens’ factual political knowledge on 
their propensity to vote according to performance Þ 
performance constitutes a heuristic that citizens use to 
guide their political decisions. Therefore, the propensity to 
vote looking at the performance of the government will be 
homogeneous across citizens independently of their 
political expertise 
 
A refutation of the assumption of 
Key, 1966: the heterogeneous 
economic voting behaviour (Althaus, 
2003; Gómez and Wilson, 2001, 
2006; Krause, 1997). 
The propensity to vote according to the performance of 
the government will be heterogeneous across citizens, 
depending on their political expertise Þ As citizens 
become more knowledgeable about politics, their 
propensity to vote on the basis of performance will 
increase 
(Source: my own elaboration. In italics the hypotheses to be tested in this paper) 
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To sum up, both ideological and performance voting explain individual voting as the 
product of a rational decision. For a decision to be rational, a certain amount of information is 
needed. I expect the likelihood of ideological and performance voting to increase as the level 
of factual political knowledge grows. Studies which explore the influence of political 
knowledge on voting decisions are scarce (but see Andersen et al., 2001; Bartels, 1996; 
Gómez and Wilson, 2001; Krause, 1997; Zaller, 2002 and 2004). I shall now analyse post-
electoral survey data from four different polities. 
 
 
 
3. Data and cases 
 
I want to test the comparative effect of political expertise on ideological and 
performance voting in the European multiparty systems. Here voters will find more 
difficulties in selecting which party is ideologically closer to their position than in two party 
systems. In addition, multiparty systems are often related to coalition governments where 
performance voting requires greater political knowledge for voters to hold the government 
responsible for outcomes. Thus, both ideological and performance voting will require 
comparatively more information for rational voters who want to cast their vote according to 
ideological proximity or retrospective assessments of performance. 
 
The CSES project provides comparable post-electoral survey data for different 
countries. In each country, national probability samples of the adult population were 
interviewed shortly after a national election. A problem with post-electoral surveys is that the 
levels of political knowledge might be overestimated: in electoral campaigns voters get the 
highest degree of political information of the whole legislature. Acquiring information at 
those times is less costly than in the middle of a mandate. Political knowledge can also be 
higher when elections are very competitive and political tension is high.3 
                                               
3 The levels of political knowledge estimated in post-electoral surveys are especially high for Poland in 
comparison with the rest of countries included in the analysis. (see descriptive statistics in the Appendix: Tables 
A.1 and A.2) 
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Nevertheless, this bias in the level of political knowledge goes in the same direction 
across countries. Moreover the overestimation of citizens’ political knowledge goes against 
my main hypothesis -that both ideological and performance voting are influenced by 
variations in voters’ political knowledge. Political knowledge some weeks after an election 
should be more uniformly distributed than in the middle of a mandate. 
 
I have chosen four different polities from the CSES Module 2 (June, 2005). I use this 
comparative design in order to examine the robustness of the hypotheses proposed in Table 1. 
That is, whether ideological or performance voting is mediated by citizens’ political 
knowledge across different polities. The countries present considerable variations –on their 
democratic history, the complexity of their multiparty systems, the level of competition of the 
campaigns, the extent of electoral participation, the type of government, and the performance 
of the economy. Table 2 summarizes all these features. It classifies each election according to 
the degree of competitiveness and the level of turnout. It also provides information on the 
political systems: which was the incumbent party at the time of election, whether the 
government was a coalition or not, whether the government had majoritarian support in 
parliament or not. All of the elections resulted in a government change. Economic 
performance was particularly bad in Portugal and Poland –where the government was also 
accused of corruption. In contrast, the economic performance in Hungary and Spain was 
relatively good, though policies implemented by the governments were unpopular (such as 
the Spanish military participation in the Irak war4) and the Hungarian government was 
accused of corruption.  
 
Table 2 also classifies the electoral campaigns carried out in each country as based on 
ideology or performance.5 The campaign was clearly dominated by performance in Hungary, 
Poland, and Portugal. In the case of Hungary this was mixed up with the nationalist agenda of 
the conservative Fidesz-MPP government. In Poland the dominant topic was the rise of 
                                               
4 There were a number of other controversial or unpopular policies implemented by the conservatives in 
Spain, such as the territorial organization of the Spanish state, or the Ebro water transfer. The conservative 
government also had to face a national-level general strike. (Torcal and Rico, 2004) 
5 This classification is based on reports about each election in Electoral Studies (2002-2004) as well as 
on documentation from the CSES project. 
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unemployment, the public budget deficit, and the increasing differences in living conditions 
between rural and urban areas. (CSES, 2005). In Portugal, the deep economic crisis as well as 
the public deficit were the main issues of the electoral campaign (Costa et al., 2004). The 
Spanish campaign was a mixed one: the conservative government emphasized economic 
performance and “Spanish nationalism” against Basque demands. The opposition focused the 
campaign on unpopular policies such as the participation in the Irak war, and social and 
educational reforms. 
 
 
Table 2. The political context of elections in the four countries 
 Spain Portugal Poland Hungary 
Incumbent party PP 
(conservative) 
PS 
(socialdemocratic) 
AWSP 
(conservative) 
Fidesz-MPP 
(conservative) 
Support and composition 
of the incumbent Majority  Majority Coalition Coalition 
 
Change of government 
 
Yes (PSOE 
socialdemocratic) 
 
Yes (PSD, 
center-right) 
 
Yes (socialdemocratic 
coalition: SLD+UP) 
 
Yes (socialdemocratic 
coalition: MSZP+ 
SZDSZ) 
Performance previous  
to elections Regular Bad Bad Regular 
 
Degree of 
competitiveness 
 
High 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
Main opposition parties 
 
PP-PSOE 
 
PS-PSD 
 
Dispersed 
 
MSZP and Fidesz 
 
Dominant topic in the 
electoral campaign 
 
Mixed 
campaign 
 
Performance 
campaign 
 
Performance 
campaign 
 
Performance 
campaign 
 
Turnout 
 
70 % 
 
62.3% 
 
43.6% 
 
70.5% 
 
Date of election 
 
March, 2004 
 
March, 2002 
 
September, 2001 
 
April, 2002 
(Source: my own elaboration based on www.parties-and-elections.de and on reports of 
Electoral Studies) 
 
 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
I test the hypothesis about the influence of political knowledge on ideological and 
performance voting with a multinomial logit equation. Declared vote is the dependent 
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variable. In order to contrast the vote for the incumbent and the main opposition party across 
countries, the results from the multinomial logit estimations correspond only to this 
dichotomy. Each equation indicates the propensity to vote for the incumbent party versus its 
main challenger. 
 
The two variables concerning performance and ideological voting are specified as 
follows. First, retrospective judgements of performance are a dichotomous variable taking the 
value 0 (for bad and very bad opinion) and 1 (for good and very good).6 Second, ideological 
voting is tested through two variables measuring the quadratic distance of each voter’s 
ideological position with respect to the ideological position attributed by her to both the 
incumbent party and the main opposition party.7 
 
Other independent variables in the voting equations across countries have been 
specified as follows. Age varies from 18 to 99 years old. Gender is a dummy variable, taking 
the value 1 for female and 0 for male. Education takes the values 1 (low education), 2 
(medium education) and 3 (maximum education) in the case of Hungary, and ordinal values 
in Poland, Portugal and Spain (ranging from no education at all to university education).8 The 
last variable indicates the labour market position of respondents.9 Descriptive statistics of all 
the variables are given in the Appendix (Tables A.1).10 
                                               
6 The question was the following: “Now thinking about the performance of the government in general, 
how good or bad a job do you think the government did over the past [number of years between the previous 
and the present election or change in government] years. Has it done a very good job? A good job? A bad job? 
A very bad job?” 
7 More specifically, the ideological distance is specified as follow:  
* 2( )Gi ix x-  
Where *ix  is voter i ideological position in a scale that goes from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right) and 
G
ix is the ideology attributed to the incumbent party (and its main challenger) by the same voter i.  
8 For Hungary education has been specified in the equations as a categorical variable taking the 
intermediate value as the reference category whereas for Poland, Portugal and Spain the variable has been 
specified in the voting equations as ordinal variables.  
9 The categories of this variable are the following: 1 employed, 2 home duties, 3 unemployed, 4 students, 
and 5 retired. I have specified this variable in the equations as categorical, taking the retired as the category of 
reference.  
10 I also used the class scheme of Erikson and Goldthorpe (1993), collapsing it in six different classes: 1 
(service class), 2 (middle class), 3 (urban bourgeoisie), 4 (rural bourgeoisie), 5 (skilled and semi-skilled 
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Political knowledge is based on three different answers to the CSES questionnaire. 
Table 3 reproduces the questions used in each of the countries, showing the percentages of 
correct answers. Although the questions are different across countries, they were specifically 
designed to allow for cross national comparison. 
 
 
Table 3. Survey questions of political knowledge. Percentage of correct responses to each of 
the questions 
Degree of 
difficulty of 
the question 
Spain (2004) Portugal (2002) Poland (2001) Hungary (2002) 
Item 1  
(easy) 
Do you happen to 
remember the name 
of the first president 
of government in our 
democracy?  
70% 
Do you happen to 
remember the name 
of the Portuguese 
Prime Minister before 
António Guterres? 
92% 
Who is the 
chairman of the 
SLD? 
77% 
Do you know who 
presides over the 
Constitutional Court? 
67% 
Item 2  
(medium) 
In what year was the 
Spanish Constitution 
approved? 
40% 
Do you happen to 
remember the number 
of EU member-
states? 
40% 
Who currently is 
the President of 
Russia? 
75% 
Do you know what 
percentage of the 
votes a party must get 
in order to have some 
of its candidates sent 
to the new 
parliament? 
65% 
Item 3 
(difficult) 
Do you know how 
many countries are 
members of the 
European Union at 
the present time? 
31% 
Number of district 
level candidates 
correctly identified 
by respondents (at 
least one or more) 
19% 
Could you please 
name the military 
alliance of which 
Poland is currently 
a member? 
75% 
Number of politicians 
correctly identified 
(at least one or more) 
13% 
 
 
To create the variable, first the number of correct responses were added (taking the 
values from 0-all responses incorrect to 3- all responses correct). I consider no responses as 
                                                                                                                                                 
workers), and 6 (non skilled workers). However none of these categories turned out to be statistically significant 
in the voting equations, and consequently this class variable was excluded from the equation. The results with 
the effect of the six categories’ class variable are available to the interested reader. Recall that the occupational 
codes included in the CSES module employ only the first two digits of 1988 ISCO / ILO International Standard 
Classification of Occupations. This does not provide satisfactory information to properly classify the 
individuals’ class position. Hence, I do not discard the possibility that this variable did not turn out to be 
significant across the equations given this lack of detailed information. 
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incorrect answers. Then, the resulting score was recoded from 0 to 1.11 Additional 
information on political knowledge would have improved the analysis, but this proxy was the 
best that could be done with the data available –moreover, a similar variable has already been 
used in comparative political analyses (see, for instance, Millner, 2002, and Toka, 2003). 
 
Tables 4 through 7 present the results of the logic of voting for each country. The 
columns of equation 1 in each of the four tables confirm the existence of both ideological and 
performance voting across countries. Moreover, the coefficients that show the effect of 
ideological distance from both the incumbent and the opposition parties are all statistically 
significant. The sign is also correct across countries: coefficients are negative for ideological 
distance from the incumbent, and positive for ideological distance from the main opposition 
party (what the tables show is the effect of each independent variable on the propensity to 
vote for the incumbent versus the main opposition party). The coefficients that indicate the 
effect of retrospective evaluations of performance are also statistically significant and with 
positive signs in all the countries. Positive assessments about governmental performance 
increase the likelihood to vote for the incumbent. In sum, there is clear evidence of both 
ideological and performance voting across countries. 
 
I shall turn now to analyse the influence of political knowledge on the propensity to 
vote according to performance and to ideology. In order to assess such influence I specify an 
interaction term between political knowledge and each of the three variables for ideological 
and performance voting. That is, an interaction term between political knowledge and 
ideological distance from the incumbent (equation 2 in each of the tables); another interaction 
term between political knowledge and ideological distance from the main opposition party in 
equation 3; and finally an interaction term between political knowledge and assessments of 
government performance in equation 4.  
 
                                               
11 Through the following  metric transformation of the variable: 
min
max min
- 
 - 
X XK
X X
=  
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Table 4. Voting for the incumbent in Hungary (only coefficients of the comparison among the 
incumbent and the main opposition party are given) 
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4  
Independent Variables Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE 
Ideological distance 
from the incumbent -0.06** 0.01 -0.07** 0.03 -0.06** 0.01 -0.06** 0.01 
Ideological distance 
from the challenger 0.04** 0.01 0.04** 0.01 0.02+ 0.01 0.04** 0.01 
Performance (1= good) 3.17** 0.31 3.19** 0.31 3.15** 0.31 2.34** 0.54 
Index of Political 
Knowledge 1.30** 0.49 1.17* 0.61 0.59 0.64 -0.02 1.05 
Ideological distance  
from the incumbent x 
PolKnowledge 
   
0.02 
 
 
0.03 
 
    
Ideological distance  
from the challenger x 
PolKnowledge 
     
0.07** 
 
0.02 
  
Performance x 
PolKnowledge 
      
2.17* 1.11 
         
Age 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Gender  0.11 0.26 0.11 0.26 0.13 0.26 0.08 0.26 
Education (reference 
category: 2. Intermediate 
level) 
        
1. Minimum level  1.06** 0.33 1.07** 0.33 1.11** 0.33 1.02** 0.33 
3. Maximum level 0.34 0.38 0.35 0.38 0.41 0.38 0.35 0.39 
Labour Market position  
(reference category: 
 5. Retired) 
        
1. Employed 0.54 0.45 0.53 0.45 0.48 0.45 0.49 0.45 
2. Home-duties 3.28** 0.89 3.29** 0.88 3.24** 0.89 3.26** 0.89 
3. Unemployed 0.31 0.62 0.32 0.62 0.21 0.62 0.26 0.62 
4. Students 0.15 0.87 0.15 0.87 0.05 0.87 0.07 0.87 
Constant -3.94** 0.90 -3.88** 0.90 -3.55** 0.92 -3.28** 0.98 
Number of cases 
LR c2 
Pseudo R2 
872 
756.26 ** 
0.438 
872 
757.07 ** 
0.438 
872 
763.94 ** 
0.442 
872 
766.51 ** 
0.446 
(entries are logit maximum-likelihood estimates and their associated standard errors) 
** Significant at the level of 99%. 
* Significant at the level of 95%. 
+ Significant at the level of 90%. 
- 15 - 
 
 
Table 5. Voting for the incumbent in Poland (only coefficients of the comparison among the 
incumbent and the main opposition party are given) 
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4  
Independent Variables Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE 
Ideological distance 
from the incumbent 
-0.04** 0.01 -0.08* 0.04 -0.04 0.01 -0.04** 0.01 
Ideological distance 
from the challenger 
0.06** 0.01 0.06** 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.06** 0.01 
Performance (1= good) 0.84* 0.39 0.88* 0.40 0.85* 0.39 -3.22 1.99 
Index of Political 
Knowledge 0.16 0.30 0.22 0.91 0.65 0.92 0.24 0.66 
Ideological distance 
from the incumbent x 
PolKnowledge 
   
0.04 
 
0.04 
    
Ideological distance 
from the challenger x 
PolKnowledge 
     
0.02 
 
0.03 
  
Performance x 
PolKnowledge 
      
4.58** 1.09 
         
Age 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Gender  -0.14 0.24 -0.15 0.24 -0.15 0.24 -0.16 0.24 
Education  0.21* 0.09 0.20* 0.09 0.20* 0.09 0.20* 0.09 
Labour Market position  
(reference category: 
 5. Retired) 
        
1. Employed -0.10 0.39 -0.13 0.39 -0.12 0.39 -0.14 0.39 
2. Home-duties 0.52 0.54 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.54 
3. Unemployed -0.47 0.59 -0.44 0.58 -0.46 0.59 -0.48 0.59 
4. Students 0.18 0.74 0.15 0.74 0.17 0.74 0.15 0.75 
Constant -1.67* 0.97 -1.64 1.22 -2.10+ 1.21 -1.64 1.09 
Number of cases 
LR c2 
Pseudo R2 
733 
472.49 ** 
0.254 
733 
476.15 ** 
0.258 
733 
474.69 ** 
0.257 
733 
481.88 ** 
0.271 
(entries are logit maximum-likelihood estimates and their associated standard errors) 
** Significant at the level of 99%.  
* Significant at the level of 95%.  
+ Significant at the level of 90%. 
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Table 6. Voting for the incumbent in Portugal (only coefficients of the comparison among the 
incumbent and the main opposition party are given) 
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4  
Independent Variables Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE 
Ideological distance 
from the incumbent 
-0.13** 0.02 -0.15** 0.03 -0.13** 0.02 -0.13** 0.02 
Ideological distance 
from the challenger 
0.11** 0.01 0.11** 0.01 0.09** 0.03 0.11** 0.01 
Performance (1= good) 1.77** 0.26 1.77** 0.26 1.76** 0.26 0.70 0.53 
Index of Political 
Knowledge 
 
-0.15 
 
0.44 
 
-0.31 
 
0.50 
 
-0.27 
 
0.53 
 
-0.69 
 
0.49 
Ideological distance  
from the incumbent x 
PolKnowledge 
   
0.03 
 
0.06 
    
Ideological distance 
from the challenger x 
PolKnowledge 
     
0.04 
 
0.05 
  
Performance x 
PolKnowledge 
      
2.82** 1.01 
         
Age -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
Gender  -0.37 0.24 -0.38 0.24 -0.37 0.24 -0.36 0.24 
Education -0.08 0.08 -0.08 0.08 -0.08 0.08 -0.06 0.08 
Labour Market position 
(reference category:  
 5. Retired) 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
1. Employed -0.20 0.37 -0.20 0.38 -0.23 0.38 -0.18 0.38 
2. Home-duties -0.63 0.45 -0.63 0.45 -0.64 0.45 -0.62 0.45 
3. Unemployed -0.08 0.69 -0.08 0.69 -0.09 0.68 -0.04 0.69 
4. Students -0.79 0.86 -0.81 0.85 -0.80 0.86 -0.67 0.86 
Constant 0.85 0.87 0.96 0.89 0.94 0.89 0.93 0.87 
Number of cases 
LR c2  
Pseudo R2 
662 
399.79 ** 
0.286 
662 
400.89 ** 
0.287 
662 
401.62 ** 
0.288 
662 
408.55 ** 
0.298 
(entries are logit maximum-likelihood estimates and their associated standard errors) 
** Significant at the level of 99%.  
* Significant at the level of 95%.  
+ Significant at the level of 90%. 
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Table 7. Voting for the incumbent in Spain (only coefficients of the comparison among the 
incumbent and the main opposition party are given) 
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4  
Independent Variables Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE 
Ideological distance 
from the incumbent 
-0.11** 0.02 -0.09** 0.02 -0.11** 0.02 -0.12** 0.02 
Ideological distance 
from the challenger 
0.12** 0.02 0.12** 0.02 0.14** 0.04 0.12** 0.02 
Performance (1= good) 2.85** 0.35 2.87** 0.35 2.85** 0.35 1.84* 0.65 
Index of Political 
Knowledge 
 
-0.07 
 
0.45 
 
0.28 
 
0.57 
 
0.16 
 
0.55 
 
-1.26 
 
0.81 
Ideological distance 
from the incumbent x 
PolKnowledge 
  
-0.07 0.04 
    
Ideological distance 
from the challenger x 
PolKnowledge 
    
-0.04 0.05 
  
Performance x 
PolKnowledge 
      
2.17** 0.95 
         
Age 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Gender  0.56+ 0.34 0.59+ 0.34 0.55+ 0.34 0.56+ 0.34 
Education 0.25* 0.10 0.25* 0.10 0.25* 0.10 0.27** 0.10 
Labour Market position  
(reference category:  
5. Retired) 
        
1. Employed 0.53 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.55 0.50 
2. Home-duties 1.01* 0.48 1.03* 0.48 1.00* 0.48 1.05* 0.48 
3. Unemployed 0.73 0.68 0.84 0.68 0.74 0.68 0.75 0.68 
4. Students 0.65 0.92 0.64 0.93 0.62 0.92 0.64 0.93 
Constant -4.43** 1.14 -4.65** 1.16 -4.51** 1.14 -3.96** 1.17 
Number of cases 
LR c2 (33) 
Pseudo R2 
794 
713.88 
0.410 
794 
719.66 
0.413 
794 
713.88 
0.410 
794 
739.21 
0.428 
(entries are logit maximum-likelihood estimates and their associated standard errors) 
** Significant at the level of 99%.  
* Significant at the level of 95%.  
+ Significant at the level of 90%. 
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The results of Tables 4 to 7 suggest that political knowledge conditions performance 
voting, but much less so ideological voting. This is reflected in the statistically significant 
coefficients for the interaction term of political knowledge and performance of equation 4 in 
tables 4 to 7. These coefficients indicate that the effect of a good evaluation of performance 
in the chances to vote for the incumbent augments as political knowledge increases. 
 
In contrast, the interaction term of political knowledge and ideological distance both 
from the incumbent and from the main opposition party is not statistically significant. 
Nevertheless, caution is needed in interpreting interaction terms (Brambor et. al., 2005): it is 
possible that the marginal effect of X (in this case, ideological distance) on Y (in this case, the 
vote) is statistically significant for relevant values of Z (in this case, political knowledge) 
even if the coefficient for the interaction term is not. To include or not an interaction term in 
an equation cannot be decided only on the grounds of the statistical significance of the 
coefficient.12 
 
This empirical problem is coped for as follows. I calculate the coefficients for 
ideological distance from the incumbent party conditioned by the minimum (0), low medium 
(0.33), high medium (0.66), and maximum (1) values of the index of political knowledge in 
each of the country samples. In this way, the conditioned coefficients for ideological distance 
have a substantive meaning when the interaction term is specified in each of the four 
equations. In addition, the corresponding standard errors associated to each of the conditioned 
coefficients are reported, so that the statistical significance of each of the conditioned 
coefficients can be better appreciated. This is done by a linear transformation of one of the 
variables included in the interaction term across countries. For example, when calculating the 
coefficient conditioned on the maximum value of the index of political knowledge, I take the 
old value of this index minus its maximum value, and then specify the interaction term 
between this transformed index and the ideological distance from the incumbent. Hence, the 
coefficient corresponding to this ideological distance indicates its incidence on the chances of 
voting for the incumbent versus its main challenger for the highest value of political 
                                               
12 This is what Brambor et al (2005) criticise about many articles where interaction terms were dropped 
because the coefficient was not statistically significant. In so doing, they missed important conditional 
relationships among the variables specified in their equations. 
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knowledge. I used the same logic for the other three calculations of Table 8 (that is, the 
calculations of the coefficients conditioned on the minimum, low-medium, and high-medium 
values of political knowledge). 
 
 
Table 8. Coefficients of ideological distance from the incumbent conditioned to different 
values of political knowledge 
 Hungary Poland Portugal Spain 
Levels of Political 
Knowledge 
    
Non conditioned  
(see tables 4 to 7: 
equation 1) 
-0.06 ** 
(0.01) 
-0.04 * 
(0.01) 
-0.13 ** 
(0.02) 
-0.11 ** 
(0.02) 
     
 
Lowest  
(see tables 4 to 7: 
equation 2) 
 
-0.07* 
(0.03) 
 
-0.08* 
(0.04) 
 
-0.15 ** 
(0.03) 
 
-0.09 ** 
(0.02) 
 
Medium-low 
 
 
-0.66** 
(0.01) 
 
-0.06** 
(0.02) 
 
-0.13 ** 
(0.02) 
 
-0.10 ** 
(0.01) 
 
Medium-high 
 
 
-0.58** 
(0.01) 
 
-0.05** 
(0.01) 
 
-0.12 ** 
(0.01) 
 
-0.13 ** 
(0.01) 
 
Highest 
 
 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
 
 
-0.03** 
(0.006) 
 
 
-0.11 ** 
(0.03) 
 
 
-0.15 ** 
(0.03) 
Note: This table shows only the “ideological distance from the incumbent” coefficients conditioned to the 
different values of political knowledge. The rest of the coefficients for the other independent variables remain 
the same as in the third column of tables 4 to 7. 
 
Entries are logit maximum-likelihood estimates and their associated asymptotic robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
** Significant at the level of 99%. 
* Significant at the level of 95%. 
 + Significant at the level of 90%. 
 
 
The first two sets of coefficients of Table 8 replicate the coefficients of tables 4 to 7: 
they correspond to the non conditioned coefficients of ideological distance from the 
incumbent for equation 1, and to the same coefficients conditioned to the minimum value of 
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political knowledge (that is value 0) for equation 2. The other three sets of coefficients and 
their associated standard errors are conditioned to the other three values of political 
knowledge (medium-low, medium-high, and highest). As can be seen in Table 8, the 
magnitudes of the conditioned coefficients are slightly higher in the intermediate categories 
of political knowledge in all the polities analysed here –the exception is Poland, where the 
magnitude is higher in the medium-high and maximum levels of political knowledge. 13 
 
 
Table 9. Coefficients of ideological distance from the main opposition party conditioned to 
different values of political knowledge 
 Hungary Poland Portugal Spain 
Levels of Political Knowledge     
Non conditioned 
(see tables 4 to 7: equation 1) 
0.04 ** 
(0.01) 
0.06 * 
(0.01) 
0.11 ** 
(0.01) 
0.12 ** 
(0.02) 
     
 
Lowest 
(see tables 4 to 7: equation 3) 
 
0.02+ 
(0.01) 
 
0.04 
(0.03) 
 
0.09** 
(0.03) 
 
0.14 ** 
(0.04) 
 
Medium-low 
 
 
0.04** 
(0.01) 
 
0.04* 
(0.01) 
 
0.10 ** 
(0.01) 
 
0.13 ** 
(0.02) 
 
Medium-high 
 
 
0.06** 
(0.01) 
 
0.05** 
(0.01) 
 
0.12 ** 
(0.01) 
 
0.11 ** 
(0.01) 
 
Highest 
 
 
 
0.08** 
(0.02) 
 
 
0.06** 
(0.01) 
 
 
0.12 ** 
(0.02) 
 
 
0.10 ** 
(0.03) 
 
Note: This table shows only the coefficients for ideological distance from the main opposition party conditioned 
to the different values of political knowledge. The rest of the coefficients for the other independent variables 
remain the same as in the fourth column of tables 4 to 7. 
 
Entries are logit maximum-likelihood estimates and their associated asymptotic robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
** Significant at the level of 99%. 
* Significant at the level of 95%. 
+ Significant at the level of 90%. 
 
                                               
13  In comparing the magnitude of the conditioned coefficients, I consider not only the coefficient 
themselves but also their associated standard errors. 
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Table 9 presents the conditioned coefficients for the ideological distance from the main 
opposition party. The results are exactly the same: differences in the magnitude of the 
coefficients are slight, and the highest coefficients are those conditioned to the intermediate 
values of political knowledge –the exception is again Poland, where the highest coefficients 
are those for the highest level of political knowledge. 
 
This evidence provides some limited support for our initial hypothesis on the influence 
of political knowledge on the propensity to use ideology when voting. Nevertheless, this 
effect on ideological voting appears to be non linear, and in any case very moderate. It might 
also be the case that the influence of political knowledge on ideological voting depends on a 
previous causal mechanism: voters unable to position themselves (or the two main parties) in 
the ideological scale can not use the logic of ideological voting. These voters are also those 
who more frequently do not answer questions on political knowledge. The data, however, do 
not allow us to distinguish non respondants who are politically ignorant from those who do 
not want to answer for some other reasons.14 
 
In contrast, the influence of political knowledge on performance voting is more 
conclusive in tables 4 to 7. The interaction terms are statistically significant in the four 
countries. The results of Table 10 show with no exception that the magnitudes of the 
coefficients corresponding to assessments of governmental performance are higher as the 
level of political knowledge increases. For instance, if we consider the lowest level of 
political knowledge, the coefficient is not statistically significant in Portugal. And in Poland, 
the effect of governmental performance is statistically significant only for the highest level of 
political knowledge.15 I shall now conclude this paper with a brief discussion of the 
implications of these empirical findings. 
                                               
14 I have done a bivariate analysis of those respondents who do not position themselves in the ideological 
scale and the political knowledge index. The relationship is not especially relevant for Spain and Portugal (with 
a V Cramer equal to 0.23 and 0.21 respectively); it is higher for Hungary and especially Poland (with a V 
Cramer equal to 0.32 and 0.39 respectively). In these two countries, those who do not respond to the ideological 
questions are also those presenting the lowest levels of political knowledge. 
In contrast the relationship between those respondents who do not answer the performance question and 
the political knowledge index is of smaller magnitude across countries: V Cramer of 0.11 in Hungary, 013 both 
in Spain and Portugal, and 0.22 in Poland. These results are available to the interested reader.  
15 Again, in comparing the magnitude of the conditioned coefficients, I consider not only the coefficients 
themselves but also their associated standard errors. 
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Table 10. Coefficients of performance voting conditioned to different values of political 
knowledge 
 Hungary Poland Portugal Spain 
Levels of Political Knowledge     
Non conditioned 
(see tables 4 to 7: equation 1) 
3.17 ** 
(0.31) 
0.84 * 
(0.39) 
1.77 ** 
(0.26) 
2.85 ** 
(0.35) 
     
 
Lowest 
(see tables 4 to 7: equation 4) 
 
2.34** 
(0.54) 
 
-3.22 
(1.99) 
 
0.7 
(0.53) 
 
1.84** 
(0.65) 
 
Medium-low 
 
 
3.06** 
(0.31) 
 
-1.69 
(1.19) 
 
1.5** 
(0.30) 
 
2.5** 
(0.36) 
 
Medium-high 
 
 
3.79** 
(0.47) 
 
-0.16 
(0.62) 
 
2.31** 
(0.38) 
 
3.28** 
(0.40) 
 
Highest 
 
 
4.51** 
(0.68) 
 
 
1.36** 
(0.45) 
 
 
3.11** 
(0.58) 
 
 
4.02** 
(0.48) 
 
Note: This table shows only the coefficients for performance conditioned to the different values of political 
knowledge. The rest of the coefficients for the other independent variables remain the same as in the last column 
of tables 4 to 7. 
 
Entries are logit maximum-likelihood estimates and their associated asymptotic robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
** Significant at the level of 99%. 
* Significant at the level of 95%. 
+ Significant at the level of 90%. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper set out to asses the effects of political knowledge on political choices. The 
empirical analysis has shown such effects on voting decisions. For performance voting the 
results are conclusive: the influence of performance on the vote is of greater magnitude as the 
level of political knowledge increases. There are no exceptions to this. Moreover, in two of 
the four polities (Portugal and Poland), performance does not influence voting among the less 
knowledgeable citizens. This suggests that a politically informed citizenry is a necessary 
(though not sufficient) condition for a democratic control of governments based on their past 
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performance. In contrast, for the case of ideological voting the results are less conclusive. 
There is some evidence that the likelihood of using ideology in order to decide which party to 
vote is higher among voters with intermediate levels of political knowledge than among those 
presenting the lowest level of political expertise. But this evidence is fairly limited. Thus, my 
empirical conclusions do not appear to support Zaller’s (1992, 2004) thesis  that well-
informed voters use ideological proximity as a criterium for voting, whereas poorly-informed 
ones use assessments of past performance. The conclusions, on the contrary, are congruent 
with Fearon’s views about the strong informative requirements of performance voting. When 
“the electorate’s ability to monitor what politicians do is poor, then the force of the electoral 
sanction is weak” (Fearon, 1999:82). Low degrees of political knowledge lead voters to select 
politicians according to ideology. 
 
While political scientists have long argued about the benefits of an informed and 
knowledgeable citizenry (Key, 1966; Mayhew, 1974; Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes, 1999; 
Pitkin, 1967), relatively few empirical studies have tested the effects of political knowledge 
on voting decisions. These have shown that election outcomes could be considerably 
different if the electorate as a whole was generally well informed about politics (Bartels, 
1996). The main contribution of this paper therefore is that the effect of political knowledge 
on voting is not homogeneous: it varies according to the different logics of voting. If rewards 
and sanctions for past performance are crucial for governments to be representative, this 
paper provides evidence that this retrospective control depends more on the political 
knowledge of citizens than if they use ideology to select the incumbent. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1. Descriptive statistics of all the variables included in each equation 
                Hungary                  Poland 
Variables N Mean 
Std, 
Dev, Min Max N Mean 
Std, 
Dev, Min Max 
           
Declared vote 990 1.72 0.68 1 3 982 2.01 1.10 1 4 
Ideological distance  
from the incumbent 1042 22.80 29.73 0 100 1283 28.50 29.80 0 100 
Ideological distance  
from the challenger 1050 20.19 28.46 0 100 1329 21.61 26.96 0 100 
Performance 1165 0.51 0.50 0 1 1649 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Level of Polknowledge 1200 0.38 0.29 0 1 1794 0.76 0.35 0 1 
Age 1198 50.32 17.36 18 92 1794 47.28 17.49 18 98 
Gender 1199 0.39 0.49 0 1 1794 0.43 0.49 0 1 
Education 1199 1.81 0.63 1 3 1794 4.36 1.34 1 7 
Employed 1184 0.47 0.50 0 1 1655 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Home-duties 1184 0.04 0.19 0 1 1655 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Unemployed 1184 0.05 0.21 0 1 1655 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Students 1184 0.03 0.18 0 1 1655 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Retired 1184 0.42 0.49 0 1 1655 0.31 0.46 0 1 
 
 
Table A.2. Descriptive statistics of all the variables included in each equation 
                Portugal                   Spain 
Variables N Mean 
Std, 
Dev, Min Max N Mean 
Std, 
Dev, Min Max 
           
Declared vote 784 1.78 0.74 1 3 942 1.98 0.91 1 4 
Ideological distance  
from the incumbent 1092 8.23 14.24 0 100 1044 24.18 26.25 0 100 
Ideological distance  
from the challenger 1091 11.87 18.53 0 100 1044 6.83 13.11 0 100 
Performance 1193 0.20 0.40 0 1 1044 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Level of Polknowledge 1303 0.47 0.29 0 1 1212 0.47 0.35 0 1 
Age 1303 45.26 16.62 18 80 1212 46.09 17.89 18 94 
Gender 1303 0.44 0.50 0 1 1212 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Education 1295 4.41 2.04 1 8 1206 4.45 1.81 1 8 
Employed 1293 0.60 0.49 0 1 1193 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Home-duties 1293 0.11 0.32 0 1 1193 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Unemployed 1293 0.04 0.20 0 1 1193 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Students 1293 0.03 0.18 0 1 1193 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Retired 1293 0.21 0.41 0 1 1193 0.20 0.40 0 1 
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